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The Application of the "Revised 
Principle of Alternate 






According to Henry J. Frankfurt, the 
claim that “ought implies can” is taken by 
many philosophers as so foundational as to 
almost be considered an “a priori” truth. In his 
paper “Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility,” Frankfurt challenges this 
assumption. He proposes the “revised 
principle of alternate possibilities,” asserting 
that we intuitively absolve agents of moral 
responsibility only if they act solely because 
they could not do otherwise. Ten years later, 
John Martin Fischer challenges Frankfurt’s 
claim, asserting that this cannot be the case if 
an agent exists within a universe governed by 
actual sequence causation and therefore, 
moral accountability and determinism remain 
non-reconcilable. These seemingly 
incompatible claims may be reconcilable after 
thorough analysis of intentionality. Even in 
the face of existence within a nominologically 
inevitable determinism, a kind of “Error 
Theory Compatibalism” is feasible.  
 There is a common ground upon 
which those who believe human beings have 
freewill and those who do not often meet. 
There is little contention between them that if 
agents do not have freewill, these same agents 
then cannot be held responsible for their 
actions. The specific reason for this is the 
belief that a moral agent can be held morally 
responsible for actions if and only if the agent 
could have done otherwise. Harry G. 
Frankfurt refers to this as "the principle of 
alternate possibilities." In his article Alternate 
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility 
Frankfurt boldly asserts that "the principle of 
alternate possibilities is false."1 Frankfurt 
                                                          
1 Harry G. Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility,” The Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 
829. 
believes that he can provide examples of 
circumstances in which there are no alternate 
possibilities and the agent is still held morally 
responsible for the act. Twelve years later, in 
his article Responsibility and control, John 
Martin Fischer addresses Frankfurt's 
argument and contends that the 
incompatibilists--those who believe that 
determinism and responsibility are 
incompatible--may still agree that 
responsibility does not require control. 
Fischer asserts that Frankfurt's argument 
relies upon the premises that not only is 
responsibility separate from control (control 
in the sense that an agent has more than one 
option), but additionally that moral 
responsibility, if separated from control, is 
compatible with determinism. Fischer then 
argues that Frankfurt successfully proves that 
an agent can lack control and maintain moral 
responsibility, but he goes on to argue that 
moral responsibility is still incompatible with 
causal determinism. 
 It is generally taken for granted that 
determinism and moral responsibility are not 
compatible. It is assumed that for an agent to 
possess freedom of will, the agent must have 
more than one option from which to choose. 
To this Frankfurt replies “[t]here may be 
circumstances that constitute sufficient 
conditions for a certain action to be performed 
by someone and that therefore make it 
impossible for the person to do otherwise, but 
that do not actually impel the person to act or 
in any way produce his action.”2 Frankfurt’s 
first example addresses the case of coercion. 
It is generally agreed upon that if an agent is 
coerced into doing something, that agent is 
not morally responsible for his or her 
behavior. Frankfurt’s example follows the 
following form: let us say that Jones has been 
threatened with a harsh penalty by Black. 
Specifically, if Jones does not do as Black 
demands Black will kill him. In this case let 
us say that Black wants Jones to smack a 
different agent –Carl—on the back of the 
head. Ironically for Jones, (perhaps luckily) 
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he had already decided that he really wanted 
to smack agent Carl’s head, and furthermore, 
was about to do so when Black so rudely 
interrupted with his death threat. Frankfurt 
proposes that in order to determine if Jones is 
morally responsible, an understanding of the 
kind of person Jones is must be reached. If 
Jones has only one option, it seems counter-
intuitive to absolve Jones of moral 
responsibility for smacking Carl on the back 
of the head if he was already planning to do 
so. It seems, then, that the principle of 
alternate possibilities is already weakening. 
The essential question is, then, “why did Jones 
smack Carl on the back of the head?” 
Frankfurt breaks down Jones’ motivation in 
the following way: is Jones an unreasonable 
or a reasonable person? He asserts that if 
Jones is an unreasonable person he will either 
not care about the threat or be overwhelmed 
by it to a mind-numbing degree. Jones might 
be the kind of person who will do whatever he 
wants to do regardless of threats presented to 
him. If Jones is unconcerned about the threat 
and acts as if the threat is not present, then it 
cannot be said it was the threat that motivated 
him to act. Instead, it seems that Jones is 
responsible for his action because the threat 
has no effect on him. If, on the other hand, 
Jones is the kind of person who is 
overwhelmed by the slightest threat to his 
well-being, and would do anything necessary 
to preserve it, Jones might then not be held 
morally responsible for his action. If Jones 
was going to smack Carl on the back of the 
head, but when presented with the threat by 
agent Black completely forgets his original 
intention and does whatever agent Black 
wants, acting without any thought or 
consideration other than for that of his own 
welfare, he cannot be said to be motivated by 
his original intention. In this case of the 
unreasonable Jones, Jones is not held 
responsible for his action as he acted solely 
due to the threat made by agent Black. 
Frankfurt then considers the possibility of a 
reasonable Jones. If Jones neither ignores the 
threat, nor is terrified to the point of stupidity 
by it, Jones might still be held responsible for 
his action. He has not forgotten, nor ignores, 
his original intention. If Black demands that 
he do other than Jones originally intended, 
Jones would--most reasonably--do as Black 
demands. As it is, Jones is quite happy that he 
gets to do what he originally wanted to do. 
Jones gladly smacks Carl on the back of the 
head. In this case, Jones seems to maintain 
responsibility for his action, though he lacks 
control. To quote Frankfurt: “It was not the 
threat that led him to act, though it would 
have done so if he had not already provided 
himself with a sufficient motive for 
performing the action in question.” 3 If the 
principle of alternate possibilities is correct, 
regardless of Jones' motivation, he must not 
be held accountable for his action. This would 
be a difficult conclusion to reach while 
listening to Jones chuckle in the background, 
reveling in joy because he acted in the way 
that he did. It seems, instead, that in instances 
of coercion it is not the fact that the 
threatened agent has only one option that 
absolves the agent of moral responsibility, but 
because the agent acts solely due to coercion.  
 After exploring this situation and 
Jones’ motivation, Frankfurt addresses the 
obvious counter-argument: although Jones is 
being coerced, and even if he is a reasonable 
man, he still retains the ability to do otherwise 
even though it would result in his immediate 
death. Frankfurt addresses this objection by 
altering his example in the following way: 
Black can manipulate Jones without Jones’ 
knowledge. Specifics concerning the 
mechanism of this manipulation are 
unnecessary. All that needs to be known is 
that Black, without Jones’ knowledge, can 
force Jones to do his will. As in the previous 
case, let us suppose that Black wants Jones to 
smack agent Carl on the back of the head. 
Unlike the previous case, Black would like to 
keep his involvement in this matter secret. So, 
by using his secret power of manipulation 
(whether scientific or psychic), Black will 
make sure that Jones smacks Carl on the back 
of the head. In order to minimize the 
possibility that his secret is revealed Black 
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will only use his power in the case that Jones 
indicates in some way that he intends on 
doing other than Black desires. Perhaps Jones 
suffers from a serial smacking-people’s-heads 
disorder, and whenever he decides to smack 
his next victim his left eyebrow raises. 
Conversely, every time he decided not to 
smack someone, his left eyebrow lowers. 
Watching carefully, Black notes a distinct 
raise in Jones’ eyebrow and knows that Jones 
will now smack Carl on the back of the head. 
With this knowledge, Black rests easy 
knowing that he does not have to use his 
power to achieve his desired result. Jones, 
once again with great joy in his heart, smacks 
Carl on the back of the head, with no 
interference or involvement by Black. In this 
situation, Jones can follow only one possible 
path. He will, whether he decides to or not, 
smack Carl. It would seem, though, that if 
Jones decides to smack Carl, and does so 
without the involvement of Black, he should 
be held morally responsible for the action 
even though, regardless of his decision, he 
must smack Carl. Conversely, if Jones 
decides not to smack Carl but is then forced to 
by Black, it would seem necessary to absolve 
Jones of moral responsibility. In this way, 
Frankfurt means to demonstrate the error of 
the principle of alternate possibilities.  
 With examples similar to the 
preceding in mind, Frankfurt revises the 
principle of alternate possibilities. Frankfurt 
argues that an agent is morally absolved only 
when the agent acted solely due to external 
coercion. In essence, had Jones intended to 
not smack Carl, but was forced too, and the 
only reason he did so was because he was 
forced too, then--and only then--can it be said 
that he is not morally responsible. Frankfurt’s 
revision of the principle states: “a person is 
not morally responsible for what he has done 
if he did it only because he could not have 
done otherwise.”4 Absolution, then, is not a 
result of the lack of alternate possibilities. 
Instead, absolution is granted as a result of the 
intention of the agent. Frankfurt’s intuition 
also works in the reverse. It seems natural to 
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give praise to a child who has shared a toy 
with another child even with the knowledge 
that had the child decided not to share, we 
would have forced the child to share the toy. 
Moral praise is often given in situations 
where, upon reflection, the conclusion was 
inevitable but we believe the agent acted with 
the right motivation.  
Fischer’s argument attacks the actual 
deterministic quality of Frankfurt’s examples. 
In true causal determinism it would seem that 
even an agent’s intentions are not her own but 
instead a direct causal result of previous 
events. Fischer begins his article by restating 
Frankfurt’s basic position. He then goes on to 
address Don Locke’s criticism of Frankfurt. 
“Lock claims, essentially, that a contented 
slave is still a slave.”5 Fischer believes that if 
responsibility is associated with the agent’s 
moral character Frankfurt can be defended 
from Locke’s criticism. “On Frankfurt’s 
account of responsibility, if the fact that a 
desire is irresistible plays a certain role in an 
agent’s deliberation, the agent is not 
responsible. That is, if an agent believes that a 
desire is irresistible and if this belief is a part 
of his reason for acting on the desire, then the 
agent is not responsible for so acting.”6 If, on 
the other hand, the irresistibility of the desire 
or coercion plays no part in the agent’s reason 
for action then the agent may be responsible. 
Fischer examines Locke’s comparison of a 
willing and an unwilling drug addict. Locke 
claims that both, regardless of willingness, are 
still slaves. Fischer examines the motivations 
of the two addicts and concludes that while 
the willing addict is held responsible for 
taking the drug, the unwilling addict is not. 
The unwilling addict is not held responsible 
because the drug is not taken for any other 
reason than because it is irresistible. To hold 
the addict responsible for taking something 
that cannot be resisted seems counter-
intuitive. If, instead, the addict takes the drug 
because the addict chooses to, it seems 
unreasonable to say that the willing addict is 
                                                          
5 John Martin Fischer, “Responsibility and Control,” 
The Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 27. 
6 Fischer, 28. 
  
not responsible. The willing addict takes it 
because he or she wants to; similarly, a non-
addicted person might take the drug only 
because he or she wants too. If the non-addict 
is responsible because the drug is taken 
willingly, in order to be consistent the willing 
addict should also be held responsible. Even 
as a slave to the drug, the willing addict takes 
the drug not because there is no other option, 
but because it is pleasing. The willing addict 
may not even be aware of the addictive nature 
of the drug. In this way, Locke’s happy slave 
criticism seems to still leave us believing that 
if the happy slave is willingly doing the 
master’s will the slave should be held morally 
responsible. Fischer contends that although 
Locke’s argument lacks convincingness, two 
more arguments can be made in response to 
Frankfurt.   
The next argument that Fischer 
addresses is that one might state that 
Frankfurt never successfully separates 
responsibility from control. Fischer states,” I 
call this the associationist strategy--the 
strategy that insists on the association of 
responsibility with control.”7 This argument is 
based on what Fischer calls the “essentialist 
principle.” The essentialist principle states: 
two events are the same particular event if 
they have the same causal antecedents. There 
are two possible causes for the particular 
event: “Jones smacks Carl.” As two events 
are different if they have different causes, the 
particular event of smacking Carl can be 
separated into two distinct events: one event 
forced by Black, the other chosen by Jones. 
Therefore, Frankfurt’s argument is weakened 
by the fact that Jones, according to the 
essentialist principle, has two different 
possibilities from which to choose. 
Furthermore, according to the associationist 
principle, “a person is morally responsible for 
the obtaining of a state of affairs only if he 
could have prevented the obtaining of that 
state of affairs.” From this one may conclude 
that Jones cannot be held responsible for the 
state of affairs that Carl is smacked on the 
back of the head because he could not have 
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prevented it happening. “[W]hy not also [hold 
him responsible] for something for which he 
is obviously not responsible: its being the case 
that he votes for Reagan on his own or 
2+2=4?”8 Then, according to the 
associationist principle and the essentialist 
principle, Jones cannot be held responsible for 
the particular event or for the universal state 
of affairs. Fischer argues that both the 
associationist claim and the essentialist 
principle are weak. The essentialist principle 
may be challenged. The assertion that the 
event of turning on the television would in 
actuality be two different events if one said 
“turn the television on” instead of “turn the 
TV on” seems implausible. Regardless of this, 
Fischer argues that without attacking the 
essentialist principle, the associationist 
argument may be criticized. Fischer states that 
the associationisist “confuses the ability 
deliberately to do otherwise with the 
possibility of something different occurring.”9 
Simply, the act of Jones being forced to 
smack Carl is one that lacks deliberateness on 
the part of Jones. Jones, in that instance, is not 
acting with rational control. Therefore, it is a 
case of something different occurring but not 
a case of an alternate choice available to 
Jones. Fischer then concludes that Jones, in 
this case, still does not have control of the 
situation; he has no choice concerning the 
inevitable conclusion of the event. Fischer 
believes that Frankfurt does effectively 
separate responsibility from control. Jones 
does lack control. Our intuitions tell us that he 
does not have any alternate possibilities. 
Nevertheless, we do find him responsible for 
his action. Fischer then goes on to attack the 
nature of Frankfurt’s determinism. 
Fischer breaks determinism down into 
two subdivisions. “There are two ways in 
which it might be true that one couldn’t have 
done otherwise. In the first way, the actual 
sequence compels the agent to do what he 
does, so he couldn’t have initiated an alternate 
sequence; in the second way, there is no 
actual-sequence compulsion; but the alternate 
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sequence would prevent the agent from doing 
other than he actually does.”10 Fischer argues 
that Frankfurt’s situation is an example of the 
second kind. The alternate sequence prevents 
the agent from doing otherwise. In Frankfurt’s 
examples, it is the nature of the alternate 
sequence, and not compulsion to follow the 
actual sequence, that necessitates the 
inevitable conclusion. One might argue that 
the antecedent states of the world, in addition 
to causal laws, require that Jones will smack 
Carl. Nevertheless, Fischer states that the 
events in Frankfurt’s examples are not 
nomologically inevitable. Although the event 
“Jones smacks Carl” is inevitable, the events 
that result in it are not. For an event to be the 
result of actual sequence causation, all events 
leading up to it must be nomologically 
inevitable. If Jones smacks Carl, it is a result 
of Jones’ inclination to do so, which is the 
result of his serial-smacking-heads disorder, 
which is a result of his genetic make-up, and 
so on. In Frankfurt’s example there is only 
one end result, but there is no actual sequence 
causation. “‘Black’s not intervening in 
Jones’s decision’ is a non-nomologically-
inevitable component of the actual sequence 
(as is the state of affairs, ‘Jones’s deciding on 
his own to vote for Reagan.’)”11 Fischer 
argues that what rules out responsibility is not 
lack of control, but instead actual sequence 
compulsion. Lack of control normally points 
to actual sequence compulsion, but it does not 
have to. “But when lack of control is not 
accompanied by actual-sequence compulsion, 
we need not rule out responsibility.”12 Fischer 
argues that the fact that Frankfurt’s arguments 
do not involve actual sequence compulsion 
causes a distinct problem. Consider the 
following example (adapted from Carl Ginet): 
an agent, Dan, is devoutly religious. Now, it 
just so happens that Dan is about to take a test 
in his Metaphysics class. In order to take the 
test Dan must drive to school. Unfortunately 
for Dan, it has been raining heavily and he 
knows that between the traffic and the rain he 
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will never make it to class on time. Being 
devoutly religious, Dan believes that if he 
prays, God will intervene and stop the rain so 
that he can make it to his test on time. Dan 
decides to not pray to God to stop the rain 
because it would be a frivolous misuse of his 
relationship with God. In theory, science tells 
us that no matter what Dan does, it will 
continue to rain. Therefore, there is only one 
conclusion: regardless of his action, the rain 
will continue. According to Frankfurt: “a 
person is not morally responsible for what he 
has done if he did it only because he could not 
have done otherwise,” but in this case Dan 
does not withhold from praying because he 
only could not have done otherwise.13  Dan 
withholds from praying because he believes it 
would be frivolous. Then, according to 
Frankfurt, we must hold Dan morally 
responsible for the event “Dan does not stop 
the rain by praying.” Fischer argues that the 
decision to hold Dan responsible is 
inconsistent with our intuitions of moral 
responsibility. Fischer believes that he can 
resolve the argument in the following way: 
“The actual sequence of events proceeds in 
such a way that the agent’s not stopping the 
rain is causally necessitated. Similarly, the 
physical laws that obtain (even in a libertarian 
world) are such that (given present 
technology) it is causally necessitated that no 
person can stop the Earth’s rotation. If we 
accept the claim that actual-sequence casual 
necessitation is incompatible with 
responsibility, we can explain why no agent is 
morally responsible for failing to stop the 
rain.”14 If we hold agents responsible for 
events that are causally inevitable, we may 
hold them responsible for events that, in 
reality, they have no control over. 
According to Fischer, Frankfurt does 
separate responsibility from control. One does 
not need options in order to be held 
responsible for one’s intentions. Regardless of 
this, Fischer also argues that Frankfurt’s 
argument does not actually address what 
philosophers usually mean when they say 
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“determinism.” Frankfurt’s examples do not 
involve actual sequence compulsion. 
Determinism, therefore, according to Fischer, 
is still incompatible with responsibility. 
Frankfurt has not demonstrated that a person 
can be held responsible for an action if the 
agent’s action is nomologically inevitable. 
The conclusion is, then, that when 
philosophers state that determinism means “it 
could not have been otherwise,” it implies 
that all events responsible for the event in 
question also could not have been otherwise. 
In this sense, even intentions are the result of 
previous causes. Frankfurt’s examples are not 
examples of determinism. Instead, they are 
examples in which a free agent lacks control 
of a situation. This does not account for 
determinism in its truest sense because every 
event that results in the conclusion is not 
causally necessitated. Fischer concludes that 
responsibility and determinism, in regards to 
Frankfurt’s examples, are still incompatible. 
The essential question that must be 
raised in response to Fischer’s conclusion is 
“are our intentions our own?” Fischer has 
demonstrated the difficulties of attempting to 
break free from the constraints of actual 
sequence compulsion. If an agent is 
compelled in every way, for every action, to 
the point that even his intentions are not his 
own, it seems that holding the agent 
responsible would be gratuitous. If one 
answers, then, that “no, our intentions are not 
our own,” agents must be absolved of all 
moral responsibility. Even philosophers who 
believe that all actions inevitably result in one 
unavoidable conclusion might balk at the 
concept that their very thoughts do not belong 
to them. We believe, for the most part, that 
our intentions belong to us. Even if we do not 
get to act on them, our intuition tells us that 
we are responsible for our intentions. If causal 
determinism is correct, then even our 
intentions are simply the result of other events 
that precede them and we are responsible for 
nothing.  
This belief, that our choices belong to 
us, has a significant impact on how we 
delegate moral responsibility. For example, 
substantial evidence concerning how strongly 
intuitive it is to us to hold individuals 
responsible for their actions can be found in 
Fischer’s example concerning the rain. 
Although it might be correct that Dan is not 
responsible for the rain, what if he really--
without even a singular doubt--believes he 
can make it rain? If, instead of a mild 
rainstorm that will prevent him from making 
it time to his test, what if he is presented with 
a situation in which the rain will result in 
someone else’s death? Consider a situation in 
which he has a friend who is severely allergic 
to water. Dan and his friend look up and see 
storm clouds rapidly approaching, and there is 
no shelter in sight. If Dan then decides to start 
praying for it to rain (and ironically it does 
rain) it seems likely that would ask him after 
the storm, “why did you try to make it rain?” 
Even if we are Atheists and believe there is no 
possible way Dan could have stopped the 
rain, if Dan’s answer was “I just knew it 
would be so much fun to watch my friend 
slowly and painfully die due to his allergy,” 
we might indignantly argue that Dan is a 
horrible person for intending his friend’s 
death. It is essential at this point that we 
recognize the fact that we hold Dan 
responsible, not only for his intentions, but for 
his action. We do not hold Dan responsible 
for the rain, yet we do hold him responsible 
for trying to bring about an event that we 
know he, in actually, has no control over. The 
response to Fischer’s example concerning the 
rain is that Dan is not held responsible for the 
event that it rains but instead for the event 
“Dan tried to make it rain in order to kill his 
friend.” Through this we would be acting as if 
he is, in someway, responsible for his friend’s 
death. Although we know that he is not 
physically responsible for his friend’s death, 
if we know he truly believes in his power, we 
believe that he should not have tried to make 
it rain. In this way we may find someone 
responsible for actions that can in no way be 
prevented. Fischer’s criticism of Frankfurt 
using the original example of an individual 
responsible for the rain is incorrect because 
Frankfurt does not hold the agent responsible 
  
for events beyond the agent’s control, but 
instead holds the agent responsible for his or 
her intention in regard to any event, 
regardless of control. Frankfurt does 
accurately assess how we currently allocate 
moral responsibility. We do believe that our 
intentions are our own and allocate judgment 
in such a way that reflects that belief. Until it 
is proven otherwise, we will most likely 
continue to hold ourselves responsible for our 
actions in regard to those beliefs. This does 
not act as proof that our intentions are our 
own, only that we believe our intentions to be 
our own, and furthermore, we delegate moral 
responsibility based on them. 
To act because there are no alternative 
possibilities can mean one of two things: 1) I 
know I have no options; therefore, I do this 
because I know I cannot do otherwise or 2) I 
cannot do or will to do otherwise regardless 
of whether I know I have no options; 
therefore, I do this because I cannot do 
otherwise. In both of these situations there are 
no alternative possibilities, and the agent acts 
because there are no alternative possibilities. 
In both cases we intuitively absolve the agent 
of guilt. If casual determinism is the state of 
the universe, then all agents act because they 
cannot do otherwise and should not be held 
morally accountable. (This is not the agent’s 
rationale. Nevertheless, whatever the agent's 
rationale is, it is due the fact that it cannot be 
otherwise causally.) If, on the other hand, our 
intuitions are correct and we can will to do 
otherwise, then we can be held accountable 
for our intentions when we do not act solely 
because we cannot do otherwise despite our 
intuitions. Here I must create a distinction that 
Frankfurt may not be willing to make. If 
agents are free to will despite causal 
determination--in situations where they have 
no other option--the agents, if they act 
because they know they cannot do otherwise, 
are not held responsible as Frankfurt 
contends. If, on the other hand, causal 
determination results in our intentions being 
that which they are, and we have no real 
control over them, all actions are actions that 
we commit because we could not have done 
otherwise, and therefore, we are absolved of 
all moral responsibility in all cases. Frankfurt 
might balk at this and ask, “What about cases 
in which the agent shows unbridled joy due to 
the action committed?” The response is that 
even that “unbridled joy” is only a reaction 
that is a result of certain specific causes, the 
actor cannot conceive, in reality, of doing 
otherwise. In the case of actual sequence 
causation, Frankfurt’s assertion that morality 
hinges upon “acting solely because one 
cannot do otherwise” can be interpreted to 
state that casual determinism is incompatible 
with responsibility. Simply, the statement 
“acting solely because” assumes that the 
agent is capable of intending otherwise. If the 
agent cannot intend otherwise, Fischer is 
correct, the agent cannot be held morally 
accountable. With this division in mind it 
might well be the case the Fischer is incorrect 
when he states that Frankfurt successfully 
separates responsibility from control. If it is 
the agent’s intention that absolves him—
assuming his intentions are his own—then 
there is the tacit assumption that the agent has 
control of those intentions. Because of this, 
we cannot be certain that Frankfurt actually 
separates responsibility from control; instead, 
he may only be establishing that we hold 
agents responsible for actions only when they 
intend the actions 
Actual sequence determinism tells us 
that whatever we choose to believe, we have 
no choice. It may well be the case that the 
intuition that we are free to intend as we 
choose is delusional. We cannot believe 
otherwise, though, because causation dictates 
that we believe as we do. Reason, if actual 
sequence determinism is the case, indicates 
that we are not free in any sense; even our 
intentions are not our own. Regardless, even 
if we believe we do not have freewill, we will 
continue to act as if we do have freewill. 
Ironically enough, this is also something that 
we, in reality, have no control over. Those 
few of us who do act as if they are not 
accountable will continue to be labeled 
“psychopath” and placed in various kinds of 
institutions for the protection of society. We 
  
live in a delusion, but a persistent and 
pervasive one. This delusional existence 
requires a way to assign moral judgment 
within it. Frankfurt’s revised principle of 
alternate possibilities is the most effective 
means of assigning judgment within the 
delusion. As opposed to throwing the theory 
out in the face of causal determinacy, we may 
use the principle within the realm of our 
delusion. With this in mind I argue for what 
might be called “Error Theory 
Compatibilism.” We are in error concerning 
our belief that we are free. We are not free, 
and we are not morally responsible, and even 
if we believe this we are still bound by society 
and language; therefore, we believe--or at 
least as a society, act as if--we are free. This 
belief is compatible with Frankfurt’s 
principle, though in reality it is not 
compatible with causal determinism. 
Frankfurt challenges the principle of 
alternate possibilities by demonstrating 
situations in which agents are held 
responsible for actions even though they 
could not have done otherwise. It is the 
agent's intentions that determine his moral 
responsibility. Fischer asserts that Frankfurt 
does separate responsibility from control. 
Frankfurt’s examples are not of actual 
sequence compulsion; due to this, Fischer 
argues that Frankfurt’s examples do not apply 
to causal determinism. I have argued that 
Frankfurt’s examples apply to actual sequence 
compulsion. Frankfurt’s argument simply 
would state that in the case of actual sequence 
compulsion, the agent is absolved of moral 
responsibility. Furthermore, Fischer is 
incorrect; Frankfurt never actually separates 
responsibility from control because in 
Frankfurt’s examples the agents still have 
control of their intentions. Finally, if causal 
determinism is the case we cannot be held 
responsible for our actions because we are in 
no way free, but we do not, for the most part, 
believe this. This belief--a result of causation-
-is compatible with moral judgment. As long 
as we hold this belief (which is inevitably left 
up to the sequence of causation) it is rational 
to use Frankfurt’s revised principle of 
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